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NOTES AND COMMENT
REGULATION OF PROXIES BY THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION.
A proxy to vote shares of stock is an authority given by a share-
holder, who has the right to vote, to another to exercise this right.'
At common law it was held that the shareholder had no implied right
to vote by proxy.2 This was based on the theory that the corporation
was entitled to have the intelligent action of its individual shareholders,
so that the latter were bound to vote in person and could not validly
delegate this right.3 In New York, however, the right to vote by
proxy could have been conferred by a by-law.4 Today, such right is
universally recognized by statute,5 with the result that voting by proxy
has become a common practice.
Necessity for Regulation.
Proxy-voting, as a device for securing corporate control, is not
of recent origin.6 Within each envelope containing notice of a share-
holders' meeting, a request is usually extended to the shareholders to
execute and return the proxy-form enclosed therein. The form of
proxy, in most instances, will designate as proxies one or more per-
'Manson v. Curtis, 223 N. Y. 313, 119 N. E. 559 (1918); 13 Am. JuR.
(1938) 533.
25 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS (perm. ed. 1931) 167; PRASH-
KER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1937)
640; 14 C. J. (1917) 907; 13 Am. JuR. (1938) 534.
. This rule developed because of reasons peculiarly applicable to municipal
and charitable corporations wherein membership is devoid of pecuniary con-
siderations, so that the theory that the right to vote was a personal trust com-
mitted solely to the personal discretion of the members was justified. Walker
v. Johnson, 17 App. Cas. 144, 162 (D. C. 1900) ; 14 C. J. (1917) 907. This is
reflected in N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 19 which even today excludes mention of
religious corporations in setting forth the right to vote by proxy. Such a view,
however, can have no application to a modern business corporation. Walker v.
Johnson, supra.
'Phillips v. Wickham, 1 Paige Ch. 590, 598 (N. Y. 1829).
POPE, DIGEST OF STAT. OF ARK. § 2189; REv. CODE OF DEL. § 2049; FLA.
Comp. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6012; ILL. REV. STAT. c. 32, § 157.28; BURNS, IND.
STAT. ANN. § 25-207; ANN. LAWS OF MASS. c. 156, § 32; MANSON'S MINN.
STAT. § 7492-25; Miss. CODE § 4147; Mo. REv. STAT. § 4530; NEV. ComP. LAWS
§ 1628; N. J. REV. STAT. tit. 14, c. 10, §9; N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 19; OKLA.
STAT. § 9766; PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. (perm. ed.) tit. 15, §§ 108, 109; R. I.
GEN. CORP. LAW § 23; REMINGTON'S CoMP. STAT. OF WASH. § 3812; Wis.
STAT. § 182.15.
The UN FORM BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT 28, par. IV also sanctions the
use of proxies.
'See 19 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 195; STEVENS, PRIVATE CORPO-
RATIONS (1936) 468; RoHR1icH, LAW AND PRACTICE IN CORPORATE CONTROL
47; WORmSER, FRANKENSTEIN, INC. (1931) 158.
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sons who represent the existing management and control. The me-
chanical return 7 (in the self-addressed stamped envelope enclosed for
such purposes 8) of these proxies, without reflection on the share-
holder's part, obviously results in the continuance and retention of the
soliciting management's policies and control. Of course, in some
cases, the shareholder fails to return the proxy, either because he
lacks the initiative and interest, or because he suspects that the proxy
was requested for the sole purpose of insuring the perpetuation of the
existing management. Again-all proxies being revocable in New
York 9 -the shareholders will occasionally retract their proxies, either
by express act or by implication, as where a new proxy is given to
another. The latter usually results when an "opposition proxy com-
mittee", organized by complaining shareholders, undertakes to solicit
proxies opposed to those solicited by the existing management. In-
stances of such committees may be found in the renowned proxy-
warfares occurring in the Rockefeller-Stewart controversy, 10 the
Youngstown-Bethlehem merger," and the retention of Mr. Childs as
president of Childs Co. of New York.'
2
The use of proxies, however, is not restricted to obtaining control.
The majority of shareholders in a large corporation, who are dis-
persed over various parts of the country, rarely, if ever, personally
participate in corporate activities. 3 Consequently, if it were not for
" As aptly stated by ROimcH, loc. cit. r upra note 6: "The proxy ordinarily
runs in favor of one or more persons selected by the board of directors. The
return is almost automatic."
It is interesting to note that the management, in sending out proxies may
usually use corporate funds to meet the expense incurred in-procuring stamps,
envelopes, etc. Lawyer's Advertising Co. v. Consolidated Ry. Lighting and
Refrigerating Co., 187 N. Y. 395, 80 N. E. 199 (1907) ; 3 Coox, CORPORATIONS
(8th ed.) 2685. However, if it clearly appears that the proxies were solicited
in a mere contest over who should control the corporation, use of corporate
funds is improper. Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., 20 Del.
Ch. 78, 171 Atl. 226 (1934).
8 In one case a minority shareholder succeeded in obtaining the control of a
large corporation by merely enclosing stamped return envelopes with the proxies
forms, as opposed to the enclosure of unstamped return envelopes which were
sent out by the existing management. THE AUTOBOIGRAPHY OF LINcoLN STEF-
FENS (1931) 533.
'N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 19. In some states, if the proxy is coupled with
an interest, it is irrevocable. Mobile & 0: R. R. v. Nicholas, 98 Ala. 92, 12 So.
723 (1893); Smith v. San Francisco & N. P. R. R., 115 Cal. 584, 47 Pac. 582
(1897); Chapman v. Bates, 61 N. J. Eq. 658, 47 AtI. 683 (1900); Boyer v.
Nesbitt, 227 Pa. 398, 76 Atl. 103 (1910).
" See 19 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 196; BERLE AND MEANS, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933) 82; PRASHKER, Op. Cit.
supra note 2, at 644.
' See Rohrlich, Protective Committees (1932) 80 U. OF PA. L. REV. 671.
'See (1936) 66 U. S. L. REV. 66.
"Testimony in the current investigation of the Temporary National Eco-
nomic Committee (Monopoly Probe) revealed that out of 27,000,000 policy-
holders of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. entitled to vote, only 437,000 of
them personally cast their ballots in the 1937 election of directors. Newsweek,
Feb. 20, 1939, p. 44.
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the use of proxies, a quorum for a meeting of shareholders in such
corporations would rarely be procured. In fact, in many instances, it
becomes necessary for the secretary of the corporation to follow up a
solicitation of a proxy with telegrams urging the shareholder to exe-
cute and return the form of proxy previously mailed to him, or in the
alternative to attend the meeting in person 14 in order to insure the
presence of a quorum. Thus, the proxy in some instances becomes
essential to the continuance of a corporation. Again, we have seen
that the proxy-through the instrumentality of an opposition com-
mittee-may be used to protect the interests of a minority. But for
the most part, the proxy is a mere utensil in the hands of the existing
management, utilized as a medium for their self-perpetuation.
The real evil, however, arises not so much in the result achieved,
i.e., the concentration of power in a few, but in the means used for the
attainment of such end. "Too often proxies are solicited without ex-
planation of the real nature of the questions for which authority to
cast his [the shareholder's] vote is sought." 15 Prior to the Securi-
ties Exchange Act, a proxy could be validly solicited by a form which
merely stated that the shareholder authorized the solicitor to vote for
him at a certain meeting, even though no facts concerning the matters
that might arise at the meeting were disclosed.16 Such a proxy would
not only give the solicitor general discretion as to the manner of cast-
ing the vote, 17 but would also give him general authority to vote on
any ordinary matter which might arise at the meeting.' 8 In one case,
the president of a corporation had solicited proxies for the ratification
of certain transactions which he had executed. The letter requesting
such proxies was entirely devoid of all important details which, if
known to the shareholders, would have precluded the ratification. It
failed to disclose the president's personal interest in an underwriting
agreement made by the corporation, and that secret options in the
corporation's stock had been previously granted. The result was
that the solicitation was so successful that the corporation voted all
proxies in favor of ratifying not only the transaction in discussion, but
also all other acts previously executed by the directors and officers.19
Such practices made the regulation of the solicitation of proxies almost
a necessary consequence. Again, the average shareholders of a large
corporation do not even keep informed of corporate activities. Their
disinterested attitude, coupled with the fact that they consider the
weight of their vote practically negligible, seldom prompts the share-
holders to make any substitutions or limitations in the _proxy-forms.
" See 19 FLETCHER, Op. cit. supwa note 2, at 195.
'SEN. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 12.
"G See proxy forms in FLETCHER, CORPORATION FORMS (1913) 1053 et seq.
' See 5 FLETCHER, op. cit. mipra note 2, at 181.
' See 5 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 182. However, the proxy could
not be used to vote on extraordinary matters, such as a voluntary dissolution,
consolidation, or reorganization. 5 FLETCHE.R, op. cit. rapra note 2, at 184.
" SEN. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 12.
19391]
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"If stockholders refuse or neglect to protect themselves; if conditions
are such as to make it difficult or impossible for them to do so, the
State must take up the cudgels in their behalf." 20 Though in various
states statutory regulation was present in some form,21 it was of lim-
ited application. Statutes merely prohibited the issuance of proxies
for a consideration, 22 but did not attempt to minutely regulate their
solicitation. Federal legislation, therefore, was almost inevitable.
Statutory Provisions.
"Fair corporate suffrage is an important right that should attach
to every equity security bought on a public exchange. Managements
of properties owned by the investing public should not be permitted
to perpetuate themselves by the misuse of corporate proxies. Insiders
having little or no substantial interest in the properties they manage
have often retained their control without an adequate disclosure of
their interest and without an adequate explanation of the management
policies they intend to pursue. Insiders have at times solicited proxies
without fairly informing the stockholders of the purposes for which
the proxies are to be used and have used such proxies to take from
the stockholders for their own selfish advantage valuable property
rights. Inasmuch as only the exchanges make it possible for securi-
ties to be widely distributed among the investing public, it follows as a
corollary that the use of the exchanges should involve a corresponding
duty of according to the shareholders' fair suffrage * * *." 23 With
this purpose in mind, Congress, in 1934, passed Section 14 of the
Securities Exchange Act.24  Subdivision (a) of this section makes it
unlawful for any person to solicit proxies by the use of the mails, or
any instrumentality of interstate commerce, or any facility of a regis-
tered exchange in contravention of the rules and regulations of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, while subdivision (b) thereof
prohibits any member of a registered exchange, or any dealer or
broker who transacts business through such a member, to give a
proxy in violation of the rules of the Commission.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, pursuant to Sections
11 (g) 25 and 12(e) 26 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935, also regulates the solicitation of proxies in respect to holding
companies and their subsidiaries. Under Section 12(e) of this Act,
the solicitation of a proxy regarding any security of a registered hold-
oWORISER, op. cit. supra note 6, at 156.
'See 5 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 171 for a discussion of state
statutory restrictions on proxy-voting.
'See N. Y. PENAL LAW § 668.
H. R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 13, 14.
"48 STAT. 895, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78n (Supp. 1935).
"49 STAT. 820, 15 U. S. C. A. § 79k (Supp. 1935).
"49 STAT. 823, 15 U. S. C. A. § 791 (Supp. 1935).
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ing company or subsidiary thereof must comply with the rules of the
Commission. Section 11(g) thereof prohibits the solicitations of
proxies with respect to any reorganization of a registered holding
company unless the plan of reorganization has either been approved
by the Commission or submitted to it by a person having a bona fide
interest 2 7 therein, and further, unless the solicitation, which must be
accompanied or preceded by a report of the Commission on the plan,
complies with all rules and regulations as prescribed by the Com-
mission.28
It will be noted that in neither case did Congress outline the exact
procedure to be followed in order to have a valid solicitation of a
proxy, but it left the actual regulation to the Securities and Exchange
Commission,29 so that the latter may vary its rules as often as chang-
ing conditions require. An examination of such rules, therefore,
becomes necessary in order to .determine what must be done when a
proxy is solicited.
- "Bona fide interest" is defined in the rules adopted by the Commission
as: "(1) Such company [seeking reorganization], any creditor or stockholder
thereof, any receiver or trustee of such company and any duly authorized repre-
sentative of any of said persons; (2) Any trustee under a mortgage, deed of
trust or indenture pursuant to which there are outstanding securities which have
been issued, guaranteed or assumed by such company; (3) Any State commis-
sion having regulatory jurisdiction over the company undergoing reorganization,
or any person authorized to prepare a plan by any court, officer or agency before
which a reorganization proceeding is pending; and (4) Any other person who
is declared by the Commission, in connection with an order for a hearing on an
application filed by such person, or otherwise, to have a bona fide interest in
such reorganization, including (but without limitation) consumers, officers,
directors, or employees of such company, labor unions, associations and other
representations of such employees." RuLE U-12E-1 (e).
S Section 11(g) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to solicit
or permit the use of his or its name to solicit, by use of the mails or any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or otherwise, any proxy, consent,
authorization, power of attorney, deposit, or dissent in respect of any reorgan-
ization plan of a registered holding company or any subsidiary company thereof
under this section for the divestment of control, securities, or other assets, or
for the dissolution of any registered holding company or any subsidiary com-
pany thereof, unless-l) the plan has been proposed by the Commission, or
the plan and such information regarding it and its sponsors as the Commission
may deem necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors or consumers has been submitted to the Commission by a person
having a bona fide interest (as defined by the rules and regulations of the Com-
mission) in such reorganization; (2) each such solicitation is accompanied or
preceded by a copy of a report on the plan which shall be made by the Com-
mission after an opportunity for a hearing on the plan and other plans sub-
mitted to it, or by an abstract of such report made or approved by the Commis-
sion; and (3) each such solicitation is made not in contravention of such rules
and regulations or orders as the Commission may deem necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors or consumers. Nothing
in this subsection or the rules and regulations thereunder shall prevent any
person from appearing before the Commission or any court through an attorney
or proxy."
'See SECURITIES EXCHANGE AcT § 23(a), 49 STAT. 1379, 15 U. S. C. A.§ 78w (Supp. 1935); PuBLic UTILITY HoLDING COMPANY AcT § 20, 49 STAT.
835, 15 U. S. C. A. § 79t (Supp. 1935).
1939 ]
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Rules and Regulations.
A complete revision of the rules and regulations relative to the
solicitation of proxies with respect to securities registered on a national
exchange has recently been effected by the Securities and Exchange
Commission.30 The new rules, known as "Regulation X-14", which
became effective October 1, 1938,31 repeal rules LA1 through LAY.
3 2
These regulations do not attempt to limit the type of matters for which
a proxy may be solicited, but they provide for a just and complete
disclosure of important details to the shareholders whose proxies are
solicited, so that they may act with some judgment with reference
thereto. Disclosure is made available by requiring that a "proxy-
statement", which must conform with certain standards of legibility,33
be previously or concurrently furnished to each person whose proxy
is solicited.34  "Solicitation" is defined as including any request for a
proxy, whether or not such request is accompanied by or included in
a written form of proxy.3 5 Three copies of the proxy-statement must
be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission not later than
at the time the solicitation begins; one copy of the statement must also
be filed with each exchange on which is listed the security with respect
to which the solicitation is made.3 6 The proxy-statement must set
forth :
(a) The shareholders' power to revoke the proxy, and rights of
dissenting shareholders. Not only must the shareholders' power to
revoke the proxy be stated, but if any express conditions qualifying
this right exist, a brief summary of such conditions must be included.3 7
The text of Regulation X-14 is found in S. E. C., SECURITIES EXCHANGE
ACT OF 1934, REiLEASE No. 1823, Aug. 11, 1938.
' S. E. C., SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, RELEASE No. 1823, Aug. 11,
1938, p. 3. However, compliance with the previous rules is sufficient in the case
of a solicitation made after Oct. 1, 1938, with respect tQ any subject matter or
meeting as to which the first solicitation was made prior to such date. S. E. C.,
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, RELEASE No. 1823, Aug. 11, 1938, p. 14.
' The text of these old rules is found in S. E. C., SECURITIES EXCHANGE
ACT OF 1934, RELEASE No. 378 (Class A) Sept. 24, 1935 as amended by S. E. C.,
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, RELEASE No. 1497, Dec. 20, 1937. The
distinguishing feature between these old rules and the current Regulation X-14
is that the latter makes the amount of information to be made available to the
solicited shareholder more comprehensive.
' RULE X-14A-3 provides: "Every printed proxy statement and form of
proxy, and all related printed material furnished to the persons solicited in
connection with any solicitation subject to Section 14(a) of the Act, other than
documents not prepared in connection with the solicitation, shall be set in type
not smaller than 10-point roman, at least 2-point leaded; except that financial




I RULE X-14A-4. The new rules make no provision for a "waiting period"
after the filing of the proxy-statement with the Commission.
' SCHEDULE 14A-Item 1(a) and (b). S. E. C. SECUITIES EXCHANGE
ACT OF 1934, RELEASE No. 1823, Aug. 11, 1938.
[ VOL. 13
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If any matter to be acted upon pursuant to the proxy carries with it a
statutory right of appraisal to a dissenting shareholder, the proxy-
statement must briefly summarize or quote the provisions of the stat-
ute, as well as any charter or other provision relative thereto.3 8 Thus,
if the solicitation concerns the consolidation 39 or the merger 40 of the
corporation, or the voluntary sale of the franchise or property of the
corporation, 41 or the sale of the remaining property on a voluntary
dissolution of the corporation,42 or the issuance of stock to employees,
43
the shareholders' right of appraisal must be explained. Few share-
holders are even aware that in certain instances they have a right of
appraisal-this provision not only informs them of such right, but it
also enables them to ascertain whether or not their right of appraisal
under the circumstances would warrant their dissenting.
(b) Plan of compensation, if any, and expenses for solicitation.
Although there is usually no general plan of compensation in the
ordinary case of the solicitation of proxies, in some instances the cor-
poration will procure the services of those who are especially engaged
in the business of soliciting proxies. While the rules of the Commis-
sion do not attempt to eliminate such practices, they do provide for a
full disclosure of the agreement between the corporation and such
persons. Thus, the general plan itself, plus the amount of compensa-
tion, directly or indirectly, paid or to be paid, must be stated. In any
case, whether there is a general plan of compensation or not, the
proxy-statement must reveal all other expenses incurred, such as the
cost of envelopes, postage, printing, etc.44 These provisions, of course,
do not sanction the compensation of a shareholder for his proxy, but,
on the contrary, any payment for the proxy in New York will not
only vitiate the proxy,45 but will subject the shareholder to criminal
liability as well.46
(c) The identification of the persons soliciting the proxy. This
enables the shareholder to determine whether the proxy is solicited
in behalf of the existing management. If such is the case, a clear
statement to that effect must be made.4 7  Further, if a director has
given written notice to the corporation that he is not in favor of the
action to be taken and that he intends to solicit proxies in opposition
thereto, such fact must also be stated.48 If the solicitation is not made
by the management or the corporation, the names of the persons
SCHEDULE 14A-ITE 2.
I N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 87.
'OId. §21.
RId. §21.
Id. § 105a.43Id. §21.
" SCHEDULE 14A-ITEii 3.
'IN. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 47.
' N. Y. PENAL LAW § 668.
a SCHEDULE 14A-ITEm 4(a).
"Id. ITEi 4(c).
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actually making the solicitation and the approximate amount of securi-
ties owned either beneficially or of record by such persons and their
associates 49 must be stated.50  In either case, whether it is solicited
in behalf of the management or not, the proxy-statement must contain
information as to any substantial interest of any director, officer or
associates in any matter to be acted upon pursuant to the proxy.51
(d) The matters to be acted upon pursuant to the proxy. Under
this heading the rules prescribe specific requirements for each differ-
ent type of matter concerned.5 2  Thus, where the proxy is to cover
the election of directors, information as to each candidate for whom
the solicitor intends to vote must be included. The information called
for will enable the shareholder solicited to determine the nominee's
interest in property acquired by the corporation not in the ordinary
course of business, the security holdings of the nominee, and the rela-
tionship between the nominee and the person or persons primarily
responsible for his original designation as a candidate.13  Similarly,
where the solicitation relates to the acquisition or disposition of prop-
erty by the corporation, specified information as to the character of
the property, the fairness of the consideration, and the relationship of
the transferor or transferee to the corporation, is required. 54  If the
matter to be acted upon is not specifically included in the rules, then
information of the same substantial character as is required in the
other items must be furnished. 55
The exact order of these items is not required to be followed. 56
In fact, literal adherence, without regard to the purpose of the rule,
may result in making the proxy-statement misleading and thus viola-
" "Associate" is defined as: "(1) any corporation or organization (other
than the issuer) of which such person owns of record or beneficially 10%7 or
more of any class of voting securities, (2) any firm of which such person is a
partner, and (3) any relative or spouse of such person having the same home
as such person." RULE X-14A-9(e).
' SCHEDULE 14A-Em 5 (a) and (b).
'Id. ITEms 4(b), 5(c). But no statement need be made as to any interest
arising solely by his being a director, officer, or associate of the solicitor; nor
need any statement be made by reason of his security holdings unless the matter
to be acted upon involves the issuance, modification or exchange of any class of
securities. Id. ITEM 4(b).
The rules divide the matters to be acted upon and provide for specific
information relating to each as follows: (1) election of directors or other
officials; (2) plan providing for remuneration of any director, officer, or
employee; (3) amendment of charter, by-laws, or other document; (4) author-
ization or issuance of securities, otherwise than in exchange for outstanding
securities of the issuer; (5) plan for the modification of any class of securities,
or the issuance of issuer's securities in exchange for its outstanding securities;
(6) plan involving the merger, consolidation, or sale of assets; (7) acquisition
or disposition of any property; (8) action to be taken with respect to any report






five of Rule X-14A-5.57 The rules, in recognition of the fact that
general questions are occasionally submitted to the shareholders before
the complete terms and conditions thereof can be determined, further
provide that any information required to be disclosed, but which is
neither known nor reasonably available to the solicitor, may be omit-
ted, provided that a brief statement of the circumstances making such
information unavailable be included in lieu thereof; nor need matters
to occur or to be determined in the future be stated other than in
terms of present intention, so long as the limit of the authority intended
to be conferred concerning such matters be set forth to the fullest
extent practicable.58
We have seen that a proxy ordinarily conferred general authority
and discretion to the holder to vote upon any ordinary matter which
might arise at the meeting.59 The result was that in many instances
the shareholder subsequently discovered that he had, through the
medium of the proxy, voted in favor of a proposition of which he in
fact disapproved. Though the shareholder could have limited the
authority and discretion of the holder by expressly so providing,60 he
rarely did so. Today, under the rules of the Commission, the author-
ity of the proxy-holder is necessarily limited inasmuch as the proxy-
statement must specifically describe each item to be acted upon pur-
suant to the proxy, so that the authority of the solicitor is accordingly
confined to such matters that are so disclosed. Furthermore, the
rules provide for a method whereby the discretion of the proxy-holder
can be controlled. This is accomplished by placing a specific duty on
the solicitor to provide means whereby the shareholder solicited is
given the opportunity to direct the manner in which his vote shall be
cast on each of the items under consideration (other than the election
of directors or other officials).61 Thus, if the shareholder does direct
the way his vote shall be cast, the discretion of the proxy-holder will
be limited thereby. 2  But the, shareholder must avail himself of this
opportunity, else full discretion will be deemed to be conferred to the
holder.
Under Section 14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act relative to
the execution of proxies by brokers in whose name the customer's
stock is held of record, the Commission has adopted no rules or regu-
lations, so that in the absence thereof, there are no limitations imposed.
RULE X-14A-5 provides: "False or misleading statements. No solicitation
subject to Section 14(a) of the Act shall be made by means of any form of
proxy, notice of meeting, or other communication containing any statement
which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made,
is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or omits to state any
material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or
misleading."
I RumL X-14A-1 (b).
'See notes 17, 18, supra.
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However, it is to be remembered that the particular exchange of
which the broker is a member usually imposes restrictions upon such
solicitations.63 Violation of these exchange rules, of course, imposes
no criminal liability, but may subject the member to expulsion.
Under the Public Utility Holding Company Act, the Commis-
sion is given authority not only to regulate the solicitation of proxies
regarding any security of a registered holding company or its sub-
sidiary, but also the solicitation of proxies or other authorizations in
connection with a reorganization plan of a registered holding com-
pany. 64  In the former case, the same rules apply as if the proxy
solicited affected securities registered on a national securities ex-
change, 65 so that Regulation X-14 would be applicable. In the latter
case, Rules U-12E-1 through U-12E-6 apply.66 Under these rules a
proxy with respect to a consent to or dissent from a plan of reorgan-
ization may not be solicited unless the plan has been submitted to the
Commission and it has reported thereon. 67  If more than twenty-five
owners of securities or claims are solicited for such a consent or
dissent, a declaration under Rule U-12E-5 must also be filed. 68  How-
ever, a solicitation of a proxy or other authorization in connection
with or in anticipation of a reorganization which does not constitute a
consent or dissent is permissible, even though the Commission has not
reported on the plan.69 In such case, if not more than twenty-five
owners of securities 70 are solicited, no material whatsoever need
be filed with the Commission. 71 If more than twenty-five owners
are solicited,72 the solicitation must be accompanied or preceded
by a statement containing the names, business connections, security
holdings and interest in the plan of the persons making the solici-
tations and of each person on whose behalf such person is acting, and
' See RULES 770-775 of the NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, p. C-465, effec-
tive Jan. 16, 1939.
See notes 25, 26, supra.
RULE U-12E-2. However, no documents need be filed with any national
securities exchange unless the security is actually registered on such exchange.
'The text of these rules is found in S. E. C., PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING
COMPANY ACT OF 1935, RELEASE No. 759, July 26, 1937.
These rules are not applicable to solicitations with respect to plans which
have been commenced in good faith before registration, or where the plan has
been approved by a court before Dec. 1, 1935. OPINION OF GENERAL COUNSEL
TO COMMISSION, S. E. C., PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING bOMPANY ACT OF 1935,
RELEASE No. 41, Dec. 2, 1935, as modified by OPINION OF GENERAL COUNSEL TO
COMMISSION, S. E. C., PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY ACT OF 1935,
RELEASE No. 1110, May 31, 1938.
'RULE U-12E-3(b)-(2).
' RULE U-12E-3 (d).
'RULE U-12E-3(c).
RULE U-12E-3 (b) provides: "For the purpose of computing such number
of owners, all persons having any legal or beneficial interest in any specific
security or claim shall be counted as a single owner."IRULE U-12E-3 (b) - (1).
" However, the Commission may, for cause shown, increase the number of
owners which may be solicited without the necessity of filing any material with
the Commission. RULE U-12E-3(b)-(1).
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the authorization must expressly provide that it is unconditionally
revocable by the grantor, and that it does not constitute nor authorize
any person to give a consent to or dissent from any plan of reorgan-
ization.73 These solicitations would merely enable the solicitor to
represent the grantor in the negotiation, formulation, or development of
a reorganization plan or to appear in any proceeding in connection with
such plan, but would not empower him to either consent to nor dissent
from such plan. The obvious purpose of these rules is to insure that
the shareholder solicited be provided with adequate information con-
cerning the reorganization plan and the solicitor's interest therein;
the rules further protect the shareholder by providing that in any
case, whether any material is filed with the Commission or not, the
proxy or other authorization must make adequate provision for the
review by a disinterested person of all expenses and fees to be in-
curred, for the submission of periodic reports and statements of
account to the grantor, and for the prohibition against dealing in the
securities affected by the reorganization by 'the solicitor or his
associates.74
Exempted Solicitations.
Although the rules and regulations as promulgated by the Com-
mission under the Securities Exchange Act are generally applicable to
any solicitation of proxies as well as to solicitations of other authoriza-
tions, 75 in certain instances the rules of the Commission will exempt
specified solicitations from the inhibition of the Act. Thus, the proxy
rules are not applicable to any solicitation made otherwise than by the
use of the mails or by any means of instrumentality of interstate com-
merce or any facility of any national securities exchange.76 Since the
constitutionality of the Act is based on the power of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce and its control over the mails, 77 this
exemption is a logical consequence. So, too, in accordance with the
general plan of the Act to exempt transactions already subject to
governmental or judicial control,78 solicitations of acceptances of a
plan of reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act or of
the authorizations to accept any such plan, are exempt if made sub-
sequent to the entry of an order approving such plan pursuant to
Section 174 of the Bankruptcy Act. 79 Similarly, any solicitation of a
proxy evidenced by a certificate of deposit or any other security which
71RULE U-12E-3 (c).
"RULE U-12E-3(a)-(3).
"OPINION OF GENERAL COUNSEL TO CoMtIMISSION, S. E. C., SECURITIES
EXCHANGE AcT oF 1934, RELEASE No. 461, Jan. 21, 1936.
"RULE X-14A:-7(a).
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is registered under the Securities Act of 1933 is also exempt.80 The
rules, therefore, would not apply to solicitations by a protective com-
mittee of the deposit of securities under an agreement whereby certifi-
cates of deposit are issuable, since such certificates are securities
within the Act of 1933, and must be registered thereunder. 8' The
rules are also not applicable to solicitations by a person in respect to
securities carried in his name or in the name of his nominees, or held
in his custody, provided that he received no compensation for the
solicitation, and further, that he furnished a copy of all soliciting
material to the person whose proxy is solicited.8 2
In addition to the exemptions specifically provided by Regulation
X-14, further exemptions are provided by Rule JF4(b) to solicita-
tions of proxies with reference to securities admitted to unlisted trad-
ing privileges but not listed as registered securities on a national
exchange; by Rule AN18 with reference to securities of foreign
issuers and American depositary receipts; and by Section 11(f) of
the Bankruptcy Act to solicitations with reference to certain proxies
in connection with railroad reorganizations. The Commission, in its
discretion, may further increase the types of solicitations which are
exempt from its rules.
Enforcement of the Rules.
Persons who contemplate the solicitation of proxies falling within
the scope of the Act, may obtain suggestions or informal opinions
from the Commission in advance of the actual filing of the proxy-
statement.8 3 These consultations, which enable the solicitor to ascer-
tain, before the actual solicitation, whether or not it will conform to
the Commission's regulations, usually result in a satisfactory compli-
ance with the proxy rules. But where an improper solicitation is
brought to the Commission's attention, it may make investigations to
determine whether any rule has been violated, and it may prosecute an
action in any federal court to restrain, violations of the Act or any of
its regulations.8 4  Accordingly, where the proxy-statement does not
SId. 14A-7 (d).
See OPINION OF GENERAL COUNSEL TO COMIlSSION, S. E. C., SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, RELEASE No. 461, Jan. 21, 1936.
'RULE X-14A-7(b). Under the old RULE LA-2 the exemptions were not
so broad, but included only solicitations by banks, dealers, brokers, nominees,
custodians, and trustees.
' S. E. C., SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, RELEASE No. 1823, Aug. 11,
1938, p. 2. Such persons are requested to present their questions as far in
advance of the solicitation as is practicable. Ibid.
The Commission reports that there has been a substantial increase during
the fiscal year of 1938 of occasions wherein material was submitted to the
Commission for comment in advance of the actual solicitation. FOURTH AN-
NUAL REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (1938) 70.
"SECURITIES EXCHANGE AT § 23, 49 STAT. 1921, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78u
(Supp. 1935); PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY ACT § 19, 49 STAT. 832,
15 U. S. C. A. § 79r (Supp. 1935).
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adequately describe the matters to be acted upon pursuant to the
proxy, the Commission may file a bill seeking an order restraining the
use of such proxies. Generally, however, the Commission does not
take such drastic action, but will require the solicitor to recircularize
the shareholders with additional information supplementing and eluci-
dating the original proxy-statement. 85 In such cases, the Commis-
sion will also require that a form of revocation or confirmation be sent
to those solicited so that they can revoke or confirm their proxies on
the basis of the full disclosure. Where the solicitor refuses to trans-
mit additional information to the shareholders, the Commission, de-
pending on the character of the particular case, will itself recircularize
the shareholders with the necessary information. 6 Of course, only
proxies obtained or confirmed on the basis of the additional informa-
tion may be voted upon. While the willful violation of any rule of
the Commission or the willful making of any false or misleading state-
ment in connection with any solicitation will impose criminal liability
on the solicitor,8 7 the rules of the Commission expressly provide that
such violations shall not invalidate any proxy pursuant to which
action has actually been taken. 88
The procedure of the Commission can be best understood by
examining the steps taken by it in investigating solicitations. In one
case, the management solicited the approval of the proposed dissolu-
tion of the corporation. A letter, signed by the president, had been
sent to those solicited, in which the president, stating that he owned
more than six and one-half times as many shares of the common
stock as he owned of preferred, urged the approval of the dissolution.
The Commission, after examining the facts, concluded that the letter
was misleading, since it failed to state that there were almost eight
times as many shares of common stock as there were of preferred, so
that the proportional interest of the president in the preferred shares
was in fact greater than his interest in the common. The Commis-
sion further found that those whose proxies were solicited were not
I THE FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COM-
MISSION (1938) at p. 69 states: "In a substantial number of cases in which the
soliciting material was either false or misleading in character deficient in the
descriptive material called for by the proxy rules, communications containing
information, clarifying or supplementing the original soliciting literature, were
required to be sent to security holders. Depending upon the character of the
particular case, either new proxies, consents, or authorizations were solicited or
security holders were afforded an opportunity to revoke or confirm the proxies
which they had been given. In other cases, in order to avoid the possibility of
failure to comply with such rules, proxies were not voted upon matters which
appeared either not to have been described or to have been inadequately
described in the soliciting literature."
'See S. E. C., SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, RELEASE No. 759,
July 26, 1937.
'SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT § 32, 49 STAT. 1379, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78r
(Supp. 1935); PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY ACT § 16, 49 STAT. 829,
15 U. S. C. A. § 79p (Supp. 1935).
" RULE X-14A-8.
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informed that upon dissolution there would probably be no funds
available for distribution among the holders of the common shares.
The Commission requested the corporation to circularize the share-
holders with further information disclosing these facts, but the corpo-
ration at first refused. The Commission then made it apparent that
it would take action to procure an order restraining the use of the
proxies obtained. Thereupon, the management complied with the
Commission's request by sending the additional information and by
also sending a form of revocation or confirmation to the shareholders.
Only proxies confirmed or obtained on the basis of the additional
information were permitted to be voted upon.s9
Conclusion.
The purpose of the Act to eliminate the misuse of proxies by
providing that full disclosure be made to the shareholder solicited has
unquestionably been effectuated. The innumerable solicitations ex-
amined by the Commission during the fiscal year of 1938, and the
many follow-up letters which were required to be sent to the share-
holders in order to clarify the matters contained in the original solicit-
ing material evince the benefits accruing to the shareholders.90 In
fact, the procedure of the Commission has been so efficacious that as
yet no judicial proceeding to restrain the use of proxies obtained in
violation of the rules has been instituted under Section 21 of the
Securities Exchange Act. Undoubtedly, the notorious evils and the
innocuous practices attending the solicitation of proxies have been
substantially curtailed by the Act.
Louis J. GusMANO.
ACCOUNTA.NTs' LIABILITY.
Accountants I are members of one of the most important 2 profes-
FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMuIS-
SION (1938) 70.
'Id. at 69 states: "During the fiscal year, 2,232 solicitations of proxies,
consents, or authorizations and 447 follow-up communications thereon were
examined for compliance with the rules promulgated by the Commission under
authority of Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934."
'Auditors of accounts were mentioned as being important in the Statutes of
Westminster in the reign of Edward I. ENCYC. BRIT. (13th ed. 1926) 123.
- See RICHARDSON, INFLUENCE OF ACCOUNTANT'S CERTIFICATES ON COM-
MERCIAL CREDIT (1913) ; Watson, Compulsory Audits by Public Accountants(1933) 56 J. Acc'y. 250; Kimball, Accountant's Reports from a Banker's View-
point (1937) 65 J. Acc'y. 267; Note (1931) 31 COL. L. REv. 867.
The Securities and Exchange Commission may require balance sheets and
profit and loss statements contained in the registration statements and the annual
reports of issuers of registered securities to be certified by independent accoun-
